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sighted notions of prerogatives and our petty jealousies; therefore, is it not high
time that we took stock of our several problems and united in a sincere effort
to regain our positions in society through being better able to serve society in
its ever changing needs?" To such a proposal I am in most hearty accord. Let's
see what we can do with it.
As Mr. Ernst warns, the task will not be easy. It will not even be easy to
enlist the concurrence and enthusiasm of the leaders of our several professions.
It will not be easy to sell the idea to a foundation willing to undertake and
finance a comprehensive analysis of the entire field. And it will be hard, indeed,
to sell the conclusions arrived at through such a survey to professional leaders
and laymen alike.
Surely, it will be a hard task, but it is a most worthwhile task. The need is
pressing and the goal is invaluable. Let each of us do what he can.
Jerome Frank*
I'VE BEEN ASKED BY THE EDITOR and by Morris Ernst to comment on the latter's
paper. I'm doing so hastily and sketchily. Morris Ernst is one of my dearest
and most respected friends. I delight in his many-sidedness, his inventiveness,
and his eager, often effective, desire to aid not only humanity but also specific
human beings. Moreover, I agree with many of his assumptions and prejudices.'
Nevertheless, I have several criticisms of Ernst's paper. If they seem some-
what abrupt in manner, the explanation is that I'm writing hurriedly and that,
in effect, Ernst's paper disagrees with much that I've said elsewhere and at
length.2 (I write here in the first person, because to do so is more honest and
modest than to resort to the deceptively objective impersonal mode.)
1. It is unwise, I think, to speak of "law" as a "science." Ernst doesn't give
his definition of "law," although several dozen respectable definitions exist. The
word "science," too, is ambiguous. To most men, however, science means some-
thing like natural science, i.e., a body of techniques (which are constantly being
revised), involving a very high degree of precision and usually yielding fairly
reliable predictions. If, for instance, by "law" you choose to mean what courts
decide, then surely "law" is not such a science.
2. It is even more unwise to talk of "social sciences" when you mean studies
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
'Beginning in 1938, in many writings I've urged the creation of a semi-leisure
society. (I have written a substantial part of an unfinished book on the subject.)
And see Frank, Save America First 393-394 (1938); Frank, Fate and Freedom,
191-201 (1945); Frank, The New Sin, 28 Sat. Rev. of Lit. 3 (1945); Frank, Book
Review, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 474-5 (1948); Frank, Book Review, 38 Calif. L.
Rev. 351, 358 (1950). 1, too, am a "glandular optimist." (Indeed, Ernst acknowledges
that he borrowed the phrase from me). For more than 30 years, I've been one of the
many lawyers who have urged that the law schools and lawyers should cooperate with
the so-called "social scientists," and also that there be more cooperation among the
several kinds of "social scientists." I agree that many (not all) of the leaders of the
bar have been hostile to much needed reforms.
,I shall cite a few of my pertinent writings. Citation of others will be furnished
the interested reader on request.
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of society. Most students of society, when they speak of "social science," or
"behavioral science," have in mind that such studies now or will soon resemble
the products of the natural sciences. Usually (but not always) the model is
physics, and an outmoded, nineteenth century physics at that.3 (One recalls
Linton's remark: "The ghosts of defunct theories have a way of haunting the
halls of other disciplines for at least a generation after they have been given
a decent burial in their original homes"; 4 and Russell's jibe that some psycholo-
gists "are apt to assume an old-fashioned physics which makes their problems
look easier than they are."5) This attempted imitation of natural science has
been a curse to the social studies:
(a) It has seriously impeded the use of insights necessary to an understanding
of human conduct, poetic and moral insights not useful to, or used by, the
physicists. Many of these insights-employed by a few, more sophisticated stu-
dents of society like Riesman-are to be found in the writings of novelists,
dramatists, poets and philosophers." The novel, says Marias, is "an essential
means to evade the fallacy of defunct ideas."'7 "The sciences use a cold lan-
guage," writes Paul Weiss,8 "about the nature of things as they might be when
all human interests, preferences and insights are suppressed. The language of
science expresses the least common denominator of knowledge, the aspect of
things which [in principle] anyone could observe at any time. It provides a
minimum of content. . . Artists present truths in a guise which most men
fail to see. That does not mean that the artist is mistaken; on the contrary,
those who take account of what the artist portrays learn truths they never knew
or could have known." 9
' Consider Kurt Lewin's attempted application, as an analogy, of Newtonian
physics to psychology; see criticism in Frank, "Short of Sickness and Death": A
Study of Moral Responsibility in Legal Criticism, 26 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 545, 613-618(1951).
Sometimes, the model is biology. The fallacy of that analogy has been exposed
often.
' Linton, Psychology and Authority, 5 J. of Soc. Phil. 115, 116 (1940).
'Russell, Analysis of Matter 138 (1927).
0 See Frank, Courts On Trial 217 n. 79 (1949) ; cf. Frank, Both Ends Against
the Middle, 100 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 20, 38, 44-45 (1951).
Marias, The Novel As A Means of Knowledge, 3 Confluence 207, 209 (1954).
'Weiss, Science, Superstitution and Precision, in Freedom and Reason 309,
320-21 (Baron ed., 1951).
'Nor are the physical scientists free from human frailties. Consult Frank, The
Place of The Expert in a Democratic Society, 16 Phil. of Sci. 3, 11, 12, 13 (1949):
"The ordinary man's view of 'nature' derives largely (at second-hand or third-hand)
from what we call 'natural science.' But 'natural science,' what does it mean? Merely
the current set of scientific theories, the current 'just-so stories,' which receive the
approval of those scientists who have prestige. Those of us who are not scientists
perforce accept their judgments on matters of science.... When a new theory
departs too abruptly from the old, the scientific nabobs usually damn it as 'unscien-
tific.' They have certain criteria, more or less 'private,' by which they judge a novel
theory. Those criteria usually derive from the points of view (I would call them the
'just-so stories') to which the members of the ruling clique are accustomed....
The suppression of scientific ideas through the overawing dogmas of the smugly
arrogant scientific elders . . . accidentally affects the very character of nature-
both in mankind's knowledge of the 'facts' concerning nature and in mankind's
transformations of nature. Here, then, we find one of the 'scandals' of science about
which most scientists preserve a hush policy: Science is an all-too-human enter-
prise, not an aloof, calmly detached, body of objective laws and facts. In part,
it is a function of the pride and prejudice of the scientific tycoons. 'Science, says
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(b) The miscalled "social sciences," for the most part, are but phases of
cultural anthropology. 10 For their generalizations relate to the customs, group
beliefs, mores, folkways-matters which, especially in our modem changing
society, are not readily predictable, because of the numerous elusive and acci-
dental factors. "Economics," for example, has, at best, been descriptive of the
social habits, and changes in such habits, of some particular groups in particular
times and places, coupled with some rather inadequate guesses as to how other
social groups will act under other circumstances. What our economists have
done is this: They have observed some selected customary conduct, attitudes
and beliefs of a society within a limited period, the selected conduct, attitudes
and beliefs having what the economists call an "economic" character. The
economists have generalized these observations and then have drawn logical
inferences from these generalizations. Those generalizations and deductions
they treat as the equivalent of the natural scientists' "laws." Their error should
be plain: A society is not a static entity. It does not stay put. Customs and
social attitudes are neither unchangeable nor consistent within any society, nor
alike as between different societies. The generalizations about them and the
inferences derived therefrom are almost certain to be importantly false. For
the consequences of the operation of certain customs or group attitudes are often
cancelled out by the consequences of other conflicting customs and attitudes."
(c) The "social scientists" have developed a horrible esoteric, pseudo-scien-
tific jargon, probably because in that way they have sought to conceal from
themselves the uncertainty of their results.
Rogers quotes these samples: "Orientation to particular situations is only
partially determined by institutional norms even within the realm where this is
intrinsically possible." "Fundamental psychological processes and reaction
Cooley, is knowledge that can be established to the satisfaction of an expert group.
But that group may err. For 'it is with science as elsewhere; the premises of thought,
being common to a group, escape scrutiny, and so, by the most rigorous methods,
the common error may be propagated indefinitely. No group is a trustworthy critic
of its own premises .... It . . . all comes back to the verdict of the expert group,
which is the best guide we have, but not infallible. . . . The group disciplines its
members but who disciplines the group?' Many 'professed men of science are no
less partisans, propagandists, followers of fads than other people.'
See also Frank, Fate and Freedom, c. 14 (1945).
10 Consult Frank, Save America First 3-26, 415-416 (1938); Frank, Courts On
Trial 210 et seq. (1949).
Consider Frank, Courts On Trial 214 (1949): "I could go on enumerating
inescapable obstacles of a kind encountered by the 'social sciences' (including 'legal
science') and not by natural science. But I must content myself with the following
terse, crude, summary of the fundamental obstacle to the creation of a 'science of
society' (or a 'legal science') : The natural scientist uses effectively the method of
an 'isolated system,' one from which he can, for all practical purposes, exclude all
but a very few variables. He thus arrives at fairly exact recurrent patterns. Re-
stricting his attention to what are approximately repeatables-i.e., constants, regu-
larities-and (on the 'principle of indifference') ignoring the uniques, the non-
recurrents, he is often able, with a sufficiently close approach to reliability, to trace
the effects on the 'isolated system' of modifying one of its components, and thereby
to discover correlations which are definite within a high range of probability. In
a social situation, however, usually the factors are so numerous and so complicatedly
interacting, and there are so many unique non-repeatables, that the 'isolated system'
method becomes almost completely valueless. Seldom, therefore, can one at all
accurately evaluate a change in terms of a single effect; thus nice controls and pre-
dictions are seldom possible."
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patterns are involved in types of deviance from an established set of institutional
roles and definitions of the situations which lead to structural innovation." "In-
stitutions are the patterns which define the essentials of the legitimately expected
behavior of persons insofar as they perform structurally important roles in the
social system. 1 2 Orwell, after quoting from Ecclesiastes-"I returned, and saw
under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong,
neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet
favor to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all"--translates
the passage into "social science" verbiage, as follows: "Objective consideration
of contemporary phenomena compels the conclusion that success or failure in
competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate
capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably
be taken into account.' 3 Ruby says, that instead of writing simply, "[I]t has
been observed that small children do not all act in the same manner," many a
social psychologists writes like this: "[C]linical observations and statistical
correlations reveal that pre-adolescents exhibit multiform tendencies and pre-
dispositions toward variant and different patterns of behavior."' 14 Gertrude
Himmelfarb justifiably complains that, for many "social scientists," "The fifth
freedom seems to be the right to write badly."'1
It amazes one that many "social scientists," ostensibly much interested in
"communication," have shown such remarkable expertness in blocking com-
munication. Lawyers also have their jargon, but in recent years many of them
have recognized that a seemingly precise vocabulary is often illusory and doesn't
yield precision.16
Recurrently, some lawyers, goaded by a passion for an impossible legal cer-
tainty, have borrowed the vocabulary of contemporary natural science in the
fatuous hope that they could thus import into the legal realm what they con-
sidered the methods of that science. 7 And time was, centuries ago, when the
dream of "quantifying" bemused the courts, when they believed it possible to
measure evidence with marked exactness. 8 That belief they expressed verbally
in a way that has its vestiges in current lawyers' talk of "weighing" evidence,
of the "preponderance" of evidence. In the nineteenth century, Bentham, noting
that the physical sciences used scales and micrometers, proposed the judicial use
Rogers, The Language of Politics, 64 Pol. Sc. Q. 481 (1949).
Orwell, Politics and the English Language, 114 New Republic 872, 873 (1946).
"Ruby, Logie 31 (1950).
The "social scientists" should heed the warning of Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes:
"I would never use a long word ... when a short one would answer the purpose.
I know there are professors in this country who 'ligate' arteries. Other surgeons
only tie them, and it stops the bleeding just as well." An ancient writer expressed
the same notion: "[Ejxcept ye utter . . . words easy to be understood, how shall
it be known what is spoken? ... I had rather speak five words with my under-
standing, that ... I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an
unknown tongue." 1 Corinthians c. 14, v. 9, 19.
"Himmelfarb, Political Thinking: Ancient and Modern, 12 Commentary 76, 82(1951).
See Sperbeck v. A. L. Burbank & Co., 190 F.2d 449, 450-51, n. 8 (C.A.2d 1951).
See Frank, Law and The Modern Mind 90-98 (1930); and compare 285-288.
See, e.g., 7 Wigmore, Evidence 241 et seq. (3d ed. 1940) ; Millar, in Engelmann,
History of Continental Civil Procedure 41-49 (1927); 1 Holdsworth, History of
English Law 302-304 (3d ed., 1922).
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of a "thermometer of persuasion."' 9 Bitten by the natural science idea, Loevinger,
a twentieth century lawyer, envisions a "Jurimetrics. '20 But most lawyers now
acknowledge that the phrase "weighing the evidence" represents but a loose
metaphor.2 .
Judges and other lawyers-including Francis Bacon, Mr. Justice Johnson
and Mr. Justice Holmes-have been leading skeptical semanticists. 22 Many
lawyers are now acutely aware-as many "social scientists" are not-that no
language can be ambiguity proof. As that great lawyer Corbin puts it, there
exist no methods which will "infallibly lead to one correct understanding" of
another's words because, in reading other's words, "men certainly see through
a glass darkly;" that the trouble with the belief that words have "one true mean-
ing" is that the phrase "one true meaning" lacks "one true meaning"; that to
"elucidate the meaning of the word 'mean' requires fourteen long columns of
fine print in the Oxford Dictionary"; that "it is the universal custom of mankind
to speak elliptically and to assume the existence and the understanding of things
not expressed in words"; that it "may be unfortunate, but it is true, that men
often use written and spoken words without having any clear notion of what
they want to say."'23 Corbin's report accords with what sagacious laymen-not
"social scientists"--have said: "Our speech is a compromise between the ulti-
mate incommunicability of one person with another and the conventional com-
munication values attached to certain symbols. '24 "Ambiguity, indefiniteness,
vagueness and equivocation are ever with us. [We should] learn to curb the
arrogance, the presumption, that we necessarily know what others are saying."'25
"The greatest enemy of communication . . . is the illusion of it."'20 To quote
the poet, Trumbull Stikney, "You lean over my meanings edge / And feel
a dizziness of the things I have not said." Hayakawa insists that we live in a
"world of not words." "There is no contradiction in speaking of the inexpress-
ible," declared Morris Cohen, "since it is the essence of all expression to point
to something beyond itself." The "success of language in conveying information
is vastly over-rated, especially in learned circles," wrote Whitehead. 7
Many judges and lawyers have learned, and can teach the "social scientists,"
the "resources of ambiguity. '28 The ability of courts wisely to adapt old legal
rules to changed conditions is "due to the fact that the same norm is used but
with a changing meaning, the same formula with an apparent identity of sub-
stance which is verbal only."29
' 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Bk I, c 6 S. 1 (J.S. Mill ed., 1827).
Loevinger, Jurimetrics, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 455 (1949); see also Loevinger, An
Introduction to Legal Logic, 27 Ind. L. J. 471 (1952).
Cf. the phrase "weight of authority."
See Frank, A Lawyer Looks At Language, in Hayakawa, Language In Action
322, 329 (1941).
'3 Corbin, Contracts § 535 (1951).
Slauch, The Gift of Tongues 114 (1942).
' Lee, The Language of Wisdom and Folly 135 (1949).
'Whyte, Is Anybody Listening? 38 (1952).
Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas 330 (Pelican ed., 1942).
'Richards, How To Read A Page 22 (1942); Richards, The Philosophy of
Rhetoric 40, 72-73 (1936); Burke, A Grammar of Motives, Introduction, 56 (1945).
'Stone, Fallacies of the Logical Form in English Law, in Interpretation of
Modern Legal Philosophy 696, 721 (Sayre ed., 1947); consult Frank, If Men Were
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Ernst, I think, has overlooked the fact that, in the 1920's, Johns Hopkins
Law School undertook much of the job he proposes, and that, after that school
went out of business (for want of funds), many other law schools have had
"social scientists" on their teaching staffs. But one unfortunate effect of the
resultant fraternizing of law teachers and "social scientists" has been the adoption
by some of those teachers, and by some of their students, of "social science"
gobbledygook. The wiser lawyers and law teachers, however, may teach the
"social scientists" to abandon their long-winded, long-worded statements in
favor of simpler and more intelligible remarks.
(d) Few long range social predictions have panned out. The utterly un-
expected pops up to confound the predicter. New medicines poke holes in the
life tables. Accidentally discovered scientific ideas revolutionize a society.
A banker once defined an invention as something which ruined his investments.
Sometimes a short range social prophecy is more accurate; yet some of the
ablest American economists went badly wrong in their prophecies of grave
unemployment in 1946-1947. John Maynard Keynes, surely no slouch as an
economist, made one of the worst misguesses in history: On October 25, 1929,
he said that the stock market break would liberate credit for nonspeculative
purposes and halt the deflation in world commodity prices. Precisely the opposite
happened; the Great Depression was then just beginning.
Arthur Burns, economic adviser to the President, said recently that "consumer
spending is the most uncertain factor in determining the general inflationary
outlook for 1952. This declaration would have invited ridicule a few years ago,
but today few economists are any longer disposed to question the capacity of
consumers to change their rates of spending and savings without prior notice.
Indeed there is some danger that the whimsical character of consumer-spending
will now be as roundly exaggerated as was its mathematical determinacy a short
time back."-' 0
The very fact of publishing a forecast of a future social happening may, indeed,
have a transforming effect on that happening, so that it may turn out quite
differently from what it would have been if the forecast had not been published.
Thus, as J. M. Clark has suggested, the increased knowledge by businessmen
of an expected business trend may undesirably hasten and intensify it. If, says
Neurath, a scientist were to publish a prediction that a meteorite would fall and
kill some people at a certain time and place, the people might leave and the
prediction would be false; if he merely wrote the prediction in his notebook, it
might be accurate; on the other hand if he published it, the people might think
he had a selfish purpose in trying to induce them to move and they might there-
fore remain, with the result that this prediction would be correct. Johnson
refers to "that inescapable irremovable factor that every logician faces when he
assumes to deal with human beings. He may predict the movements of a planet
. . . for a thousand years with almost absolute accuracy. He may predict the
development of fruit flies, or of guinea pigs, through many generations with a
Angels 313 (1942); Frank, Courts On Trial 278 (1949); Seagle, Law, The Science
of Inefficiency 26 (1952); Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1949) (passim).
N.Y. Herald Tribune, p. 25, col. 7 (May 26, 1952).
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factor of error of negligible proportions. But the moment humanity enters the
equation, mathematical calculation loses its authority. ... 1
As I have written elsewhere:
The "Brandeis briefs," using statistical and related "data," were, for
a long time, used by government lawyers to win law-suits against pri-
vate corporations. Those court victories were due largely to the fact
that the opposing lawyers did not file briefs containing contradictory
data of the same kind. A few years ago, the engineering firm of Ford,
Bacon & Davis published a pamphlet urging corporate executives to
retain "experts" to prepare such briefs to favor corporations in litiga-
tions with the government. Whatever the cause, the fact is that now,
in many such suits, both sides present material of that sort, and gov-
ernment victories have become less certain.
In such cases, or elsewhere, when "experts" with contrasting views
collate statistics, each expert can often assemble figures which plausibly
confirm his position. Referring to the "Brandeis briefs," Sigety, a
teacher of statistical method, writes me, "There are ways of rigging
your statistics so that almost any conclusion can be reached from the
same basic information. . . [T]he statistician may [consciously or
unconsciously] 'fudge' his 'trend' curve." Of course, sometimes the
"fudging" of a curve can be exposed; but frequently . . . it is difficult
to prove the "objectivity" of one interpretation of figures as against
another.
Social statistics which, to the unsophisticated, may seem indubitably
certain and "objective," always rest on someone's selection of "data,"
and the selector's choice is seldom indisputably "objective" and reliable,
for a variety of reasons. Chance, we are advised by able statisticians,
frequently determines the statistical results. We are told that the in-
vestigator "may be compelled to employ data" which are fragmentary
merely "because of their availability"; or that "his preconceptions"
concerning the subject may lead him to believe that certain significant
relationships existed, and, without sufficient verification, he may
smuggle those preconceptions into both his "data" and his conclusions.
'Disturbing" factors may be present but wholly undetectable, with
effects that cannot be estimated or eliminated by the investigator's
techniques. The undetected relationships may be more significant than
those he can perceive. His "sampling" may not be representative, may
involve the "fallacy of selection," the attribution, to an entire class of
phenomena, of characteristics which pertain to the selected instances
alone. His "data" are then not really "data," that is "given"; and his
inferences ("extrapolations") may thus be fatally mistaken guesses.
Dorothy Swaine Thomas, an eminent social statistician, says that even
carefully chosen "data" will frequently allow of several reasonable
alternative interpretations, that one who plots a curve of a social trend
'Johnson, American Heroes and Hero Worship 64-65 (1943).
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should "not fail to admit that the determination of the 'best' trend is
largely subjective." Often, she confesses, "convenience has dictated"
the statistician's procedure.32
With some reason, Sumner and Keller asserted in 1927: "One of the ways
. . . for disconcerting even an intelligent adversary is to overwhelm him with
mathematical formulas, graphs and other esoteric devices which he cannot with-
stand because he cannot understand them. They are similar to the secret,
fetichistic jargon of the medicine man."33 In 1948, Hayes, an economist, wrote
that some economists have "developed the techniques of mathematical statistics
to a high degree of complexity and subtlety"; they "sit at their calculating ma-
chines fitting second-order parabolic curves, frequently forgetting that the data
to which they fit those curves are to a considerable extent unreliable, lack pre-
cision and adequate detail. . ...- "
(e) Since the "social sciences" are but phases of cultural anthropology, neces-
sarily, too, they are phases of social psychology. Now social psychology, insofar
as it has attempted to ape physical science, has been singularly unfruitful. "If,"
says Professor Langer, "we follow the method of natural science, our psychology
tends to run into physiology, histology and genetics; we move further and further
away from those problems which we ought to be approaching. That signifies
that the generative idea which gave rise to physics and chemistry and all their
progeny . . . does not contain any vivifying concept for the humanistic sciences.
The physicist's scheme, so faithfully emulated by generations of psychologists,
. . . is probably blocking their progress, defeating possible insights by its
prejudicial force. The scheme is not false-it is perfectly reasonable-but it is
bootless for the study of mental phenomena. It does not . . . excite a con-
structive imagination, as it does in physical researches. Instead of a method,
it inspires a militant methodology."3 Erich Fromm remarks that many social
psychologists "believe that unless phenomena can be studied in a way which
permits of exact and quantitative analysis, they must not be studied at all."
Eager to be "scientists," they choose for study those problems that fit the labora-
tory method. "Their choice of problems is determined by their method instead
of the method being determined by the problem." 36 Thereby, it should be added,
they develop a "methodolatry, '3 T and "are drawn into social blindness by the
glare of the laboratory."38
The notions (1) of "interaction" between "personality and culture," (2) of
the "basic personality" of a culture, and (3) of "patterns of culture" are valuably
suggestive. However, they become misleading when exploited as if they were
highly precise, or when (a la Gorer or Margaret Mead) glibly applied (as, for
example, in the form of "diaper determinism") to a large modem nation con-
'Frank, Courts On Trial 211-12 (1949).
"2 Sumner and Keller, Science of Society 1305 (1927).
Hayes, The Business Cycle: Psychological Approaches, 63 Pol. Se. Q. 82, 95(1948).
Langer, Philosophy in a New Key 18-19 (Pelican ed. 1948).
= Fromm, Sex and Character; the Kinsey Report Viewed from the Standpoint
of Psychoanalysis, in About the Kinsey Report 47, 58 (Geddes and Curie ed., 1948).
"Vivas, Two Notes on the New Naturalism, 56 Sewanee Rev. 477, 483 (1948).
Dennis, in Language, Culture and Personality 259 (Mandebaum ed., 1941).
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taining many "subcultures. ' s8a Linton says, "The use of psychological or, more
frequently, psychoanalytic terminology makes such works appear more authorita-
tive without contributing toward the validity of the result."
"Social science" (or its currently fashionable variant, "behavioral science")
is a metaphor. Of course, no one can speak-and most men cannot think-
without metaphors. But danger lurks in the literal use of a metaphor, in treating
it as a complete statement of actual fact rather than as an analogy or "fiction"
(i.e., an "as if" or "let's pretend"); 89 such literalism has subtle consequences
that are dangerous because the fictional or analogical character of the metaphor
is not adequately recognized. Too many students of society have taken literally
the "social science" metaphor. There are good and bad metaphors; 40 a good
metaphor, it has been said, is neither too farfetched nor too nearly fetched.41
"Social science" is much too farfetched.4
The physical sciences are now acknowledged to be far less exact than they
seemed to be to all but a few thinkers during the preceding three centuries. It
might therefore be argued that the difference between the physical and the "social
sciences" is merely one of degree. This is a tricky suggestion: It has been said
that the difference between a difference in kind and a difference in degree is not
itself a difference in kind but one in degree-a violent difference however. 48 The
difference here under discussion is peculiarly violent.
3. Judges have sometimes declared that if a designated rule were abolished,
social catastrophe would ensue. In so declaring, the judges have relied on
"judicial notice." But, ordinarily, such purported judicial knowledge has a scant
foundation. Often it is "cocktail hour knowledge." As Gibbon said, usually
a man who speaks of "the opinion of the world at large" really refers to "the
few people with whom he had happened to converse." It is most desirable,
then, that courts should have reliable information concerning the social conse-
quences of existing legal rules and the probable consequences of changes in
those rules. If the students of society delivered such information, most judges
would be delighted to receive it. To date, those students have delivered little
that courts can use. I think it most unlikely that Ernst's proposed "commission
of inquiry" would do the trick.
Some courts have begun, somewhat gingerly, to utilize "opinion polls."
.. See Linton, The Concept of National Character, in Personality and Political
Crisis 133 (Stanton and Perry ed., 1951). For further criticisms along those lines,
see Parsons, Personality and Social Structure, ibid., at 61. We have been warned by
Dr. David Levy, New Fields of Psychiatry 32 (1947) against "excessive psycholo-
gizing, of fantastic conceptual structures, erected on a few clinical observations."
See also Rieff, History, Psychoanalysis, and The Social Sciences, 63 Ethics 107,
117-118 (1953), and Bell, Bolshevik Man, His Motivations, 19 Commentary 179 (1955).
"See, e.g., Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If' (translated 1925) (passim);
Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 370, 380, 383, 387, 388, 878, 892 et seq. (1930);
Tourtoulon, Philosophy In The Development of Law 385 et seq., 644, 653 (translated
1922); Frank, Law and The Modern Mind 166-167, 318-322 (1930).
"The metaphor "social engineering" is a bad metaphor since it treats human
beings as if they were inert things.
"1 Brooks and Warren, Modern Rhetoric 426 (1949).
The subject of this paragraph is developed in Larson v. Jo Ann Cab Corp.,
209 F.2d 929 (C.A.2d 1953) and in Frank, Some Tame Reflections On Some Wild
Facts, in Vision and Action 71-75 (Ratner ed., 1953).
" Williams, Law and Language, 61 L.Q. Rev. 179, 192 (1945)
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Whether they should be received as evidence or in aid of "judicial notice" is
still an open question. In any event, they should be used most circumspectly
and selectively. Riesman, an experienced lawyer, former law teacher, and keen
student of society, who has had much to do with such polls, has cautioned that
they include a multitude of dubious subjective factors. 44
4. When "political economy" was divided into "political science and "eco-
nomics," each was gelded; as usual, gelding caused sterility. I remember attend-
ing a conference late in 1933 of economists in the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration. One of them observed that they had been so busy with adminis-
trative problems, Congressmen and farm leaders, that they had neglected their
economics. Another answered, dryly, that they had become "political econo-
mists." And well it was that they had.
Those studying a society from one angle do, not infrequently, borrow ideas
from those-who have studied it from another angle. But often the borrowed
ideas are out of date. Repeatedly, lawyerdom has made that error. Note, for
example, the adherence of some courts to outmoded economic theories, and the
stubborn judicial retention of the M'Naghten Rule in criminal cases.45
Accordingly, there is considerable merit in the notion of the "cross-fertiliza-
tion" of the "social scientists" and the lawyers. Yet, long ago, Alvin Johnson
sagely warned that this might lead to "cross-sterilization." For the effort to
achieve uniformity may result in a sort of totalitarianism46 and thereby stifle
originality. Kallen, criticizing the movement for "unification of the sciences,"
observes that it has its roots in a dread of novelty, variety, creativeness, in a
"compensatory passion . . . for a One to rule over the Many," which issues
in the stifling harmonies of a closed system.47 Any such movement may bring
about the widespread, uncritical, acceptance of a harmful dogma. (Thus, if the
courts, in the nineteenth century, had been swayed by the determinism then
fashionable among physicists and social philosophers, the judiciary would have
concluded that no man has any margin of "free will"; fortunately, the judiciary,
by then remaining old-fashioned, anticipated the new-fashioned conception of
"partial indeterminism" accepted by many twentieth century physicists.) 48 The
drive for uniformity may also induce a neglect of valuable differences between
the divers areas of study.
Nevertheless, the fraternizing of the specialists in the several areas with one
another, and with lawyers, is eminently worthwhile. The several specialists
can, fruitfully, pool their wisdoms-and better detect their ignorances (both
"Consult Riesman, The Lonely Crowd 180-182 (1950); Riesman and Glazer,
Social Structure, Character Structure, and Opinion, 2 Int. J. of Opinion and Attitude
Research 512 (1948). Consult also Glazer, "The American Soldier" As Science,
8 Commentary 487, 490 et seq. (1949).
Consult also Roth v. Goldman, 172 F.2d 788, 795-796 (C.A.2d 1949) (concurring
opinion).
IConsult Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (C.A.D.C., 1954) for a recent
departure from that rule.
"*Cf. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 618-619 (C.A.2d 1944).
7 See Kallen, The Meanings of Unity Among the Sciences, in Structure, Method
and Meaning 225 (Henle, Gallen and Langer ed., 1951).
"As to the power of fashions in ideas, see Frank, Fate and Freedom, c. 7 (1945).
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the avoidable and the inescapable). The invitation to joint studies should be
extended to philosophers and literary artists.49
In the past, lawyers have learned much from scientists, psychologists, philoso-
phers, poets and others. Also the lawyers have contributed ideas which (for
good or ill) have affected nonlegal thinking: The idea of "cause" emanated
from the Greek law courts; "average" was originally a legal concept; the
"Socratic method" derived from lawyers' questioning of witnesses; the "logic
of discovery" (or of "invention") has its roots in lawyers' techniques; lawyers
were among the "founders" of pragmatism. 0
Today, in many ways, the lawyers can be helpful to other specialists. For
example, when I served in the executive branch of our federal government,
I frequently worked with other lawyers and economists. I discovered that many
of the economists lacked the ability (a) to present competently the evidence
on which they rested their premises, (b) to differentiate between the evidence
and their unproved assumptions, and (c) to reason rigorously in moving from
their premises to their conclusions. The government lawyers often taught those
economists how to do these jobs.
5. Our governments have already recognized the valuegof specialists, in the
establishment of administrative agencies, each of which consists of specialists,
in some particular area, who are advised by expert staffs. No one would think
of proposing that all those agencies be merged into one; that, for instance,
a single agency should take over the functions of the NLRB, the SEC and the
ICC.
This indicates the unwisdom of Ernst's proposal of a single "commission of
inquiry." Ernst, apparently, would jumble together a host of importantly
different problems to be considered by such a "commission." The result, I fear,
would be Babel. Among other things, the several social studies-in their theo-
retical and applied aspects-have not developed equally; they vary in respect
of accuracy, utility and empirical verification.
6. The relation of our judges to the several administrative agencies discloses,
I think, an intelligent approach to specialists. As I said for our court in 1942 :51
Because administrative officers, if not always themselves experts,
are specialists, advised by experts, in a particular field of facts, infer-
ences drawn by those officials from the data before them are to be given
unusual weight by the courts. The Supreme Court has long ascribed
to their findings "the strength due to the judgments of a tribunal ap-
pointed by law and informed by experience," and has said that
"Congress entrusted the Board, not the courts, with the power to draw
inferences from the facts." It is precisely in drawing such inferences
that administrative specialized skill is of unique value. It is as if a judge
were reviewing a physician's diagnosis.
" I have elsewhere suggested such joint studies of the problems involved in what
we call "interpretation." See Frank, Some Tame Reflections on Some Wild Facts,
in Vision and Action 56, 61 et seq. (Ratner ed., 1953).
See Frank, A Conflict With Oblivion: Some Observations on the Founders
of Legal Pragmatism, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 425 (1954).
' In Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 220-23 (C.A.2d 1942).
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Lawyers and judges should be the last to deny the value of a special-
ist's reactions, for our profession's position in society rests on the fact
that we are specialists in our field. In truth, we lawyers sometimes
make too much of a mystery of our methods, as did Coke when James I
remarked that if "law was founded upon reason, he and others could
reason as well as the judges," and Coke replied,5 2 in words which many
lawyers delight to quote, that lawsuits "are not to be decided by natural
reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law, which law
is an art which requires long study and experience before that a man
can attain to the cognizance of it." The king, an intelligent amateur,
was annoyed, for doubtless he saw that, as McIlwain observes, "if . . .
the law was to be supreme, and at the same time a mystery open only
to the initiated, it is clear that, if the claim of the lawyers was to be
admitted, the supreme authority would be their exclusive possession."
Coke doubtless went too far, as specialists often do in attaching too
much inscrutable esotericism to their own techniques. Yet his attitude,
within limits, was justified; what Pound has called "the trained intuition
of the judge," resulting from his experience and education, does give
him, as to "questions of law," an edge over the layman.
Awareness of that truth should induce the judge to recognize his
inferiority to those who are specialists, possessed of trained intuition,
in matters as to which he is less experienced. For the value of the
specialist is that, in dealing with a selected area of experience, he is
able to make inferences quickly-because in part intuitively-and with
more likelihood of accuracy than his fellow men, since many of the
criteria of judgment have, with him, become semi-automatic, having
been transferred, so to speak, from the conscious processes to the spinal
column (or, to use highbrow terms, from the cerebral cortex to the
cerebellum). He acquires unusual "insight" and "discernment" which
are "the funded outcome of long familiarity with like operations in the
past. Possession of this ability to seize what is . . . significant and
to let the rest go is the mark of the expert, the connoisseur. . . . Long
brooding over conditions, intimate contact associated with keen interest,
thorough absorption in a multiplicity of allied experiences, tend to
bring about those judgments which we then call intuitive; but they are
true judgments because they are based on intelligent selection and
estimation. . .. ,,53 Such intuitions, although seemingly "inspira-
tional," are not antirational, as many scientists, inventors and other
specialized thinkers have pointed out. It was in that vein that Mr.
Justice Holmes, in a case in which a State Board's action was attacked,
said that the Board's "action does not appear to have been arbitrary
except in the sense in which many honest and sensible judgments are
' Or so he says. There are those who doubt the authenticity of this report. It
was written many years after the event, was published posthumously, and is con-
tradicted in important respects by reports of others which were written when the
events were still fresh.
Dewey, How We Think 104-105 (1910).
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so. They express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and
sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions, impressions which
may lie beneath consciousness without losing their worth."5 4
But, just as the non-lawyer can perceive gross errors in a judge's
conclusions, so an administrative "diagnosis"-like that of a phy-
sician's-may be so wanting in any possible logic that judges can say
that it lacks all cogency; the lack of administrative cogency, however,
must be fairly gross before judges may reject the diagnosis; there is
room for judicial review of administrative fact-finding, yet such judicial
review, if it ignores the element of administrative "professionalism,"
strikes at the very reason for having administrative hearings and find-
ings ...
To put it differently, the capacity of judges to determine that the
inferences of a jury-a body of amateurs fortuitously assembled-are
not reasonably supported by the evidence is better than their capacity
to reach a like conclusion as to the inferences of a specialized adminis-
trative agency ...
That does not mean that many a judge, if he had specialized in the
same fields and were assisted by the same staff of experts as an adminis-
trative agency, could not be just as expert; indeed, beginning with
Judge Cooley's days in the Interstate Commerce Commission, many
lawyers have served as competent members of such bodies. But, as
Chief Judge Lehman has observed, "The judge is not presumed to have
specialized scientific training outside of the law, and evidence which
might be conclusive to the mind of a specialist might exercise no
persuasive force upon the mind of a man not fitted by training to
comprehend it. . . ."55 As we said several years ago: "One of the
principal reasons for the creation of such a bureau is to secure the
benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous experience
in a difficult and complicated field."
In the courts' approach to administrative agencies, we have an excellent
analogy for the judicial approach to all specialists or experts: Their compe-
tence should be carefully scrutinized, their logic examined, and their findings
should be rejected when reached arbitrarily or irrationally. I venture the follow-
ing tentative suggestions:
(a) Not alone the competence of the specialists but also the limits of their
competence needs attention; whatever exceeds those limits should be treated by
the courts like any other layman's views.
(b) Where there are-and usually there are--conflicting positions as between
the specialists in respect of any particular social study, the courts should beware
of adopting any one position without considering the opposing positions.
(c) A court should ascertain whether a specialist's opinion rests on a doctrine
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 598 (1907).
'Lehman, Technical Rules of Evidence, 26 Col. L. Rev. 509, 511 (1926).
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that has won the substantial, if not general, acceptance of his fellow-specialists.56
7. Thanks to the "social scientists'" obsessive desire to imitate the natural
scientists, many products of the former have been little more than reports on
the trivial or, worse, elaborate efforts to prove the obvious. Rogers writes, "A
distinguished sociologist, Louis Wirth, has said: 'The findings of social science
are sometimes regarded as elaborate statements of what everybody knows in
language that nobody can understand.' Mr. Wirth might have added that the
reader frequently is unaware that what is being said is something that he already
knows."'57 Riesman has suggested "the existence in the social sciences of a sort
of Heisenberg ('indeterminacy') principle: the more accurately we can measure
a phenomenon and reduce the measurement to statistics, the less significant the
finding; conversely, the more significant the finding, the more vague wil its
statement appear, the less susceptible of experimental verification, the more
dependent for authority on the wisdom and humanity of the observer."58 He
maintains that reliance on "critical and ethical insight" has been frustrated by
"the superstitious worship of natural science, the desire in a friable society for
certainty of statement-to be backed by the universe or a Hollerith machine."
In the same vein, Bendix writes: "It has been observed that [in the social
sciences] methodological rigor can be obtained only at the price of dealing
with relatively insignificant problems, whereas the investigation of significant
problems suffers from a lack of this rigor. We can obtain agreement on social
science propositions, but the content of the propositions makes us question
whether this knowledge is worth obtaining. Yet, when we deal with propositions
which we feel are worthwhile, we find it almost impossible to 'prove' them.
Modem social science reveals a cleavage between (1) propositions which are
significant and (2) propositions which command assent, and there is no sign
as yet that this condition will be improved."5 9 Consider the studies of The
American Soldier, in which a group of eminent "social scientists" employed
elaborate questionnaires and IBM machines for the purpose of giving the Army
command reliable information useful in predicting what would make for high
or low fighting morale. Glazer reports that the results were "hardly at all" useful
to the Army command. "We might," he concludes, "take every statistic in this
book, halve or double it: the Army could have done little about it, or would
have wanted to do very little about it," for "all the attitudes 'measured' did not
matter when it came to fighting, which was the ultimate purpose for which the
studies were undertaken." 60
Such studies are often time-wasting and expensive. More important, when
offered in litigation, they may be pernicious: The use of medical and other
experts in litigation has not been too happy; in the courts, we witness daily the
sorry spectacle of hired, partisan experts disagreeing with one another. We
"See Falknor and Steffen, Evidence of Character, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 980, 987,
993 (1953).
"Rogers, The Language of Politics, 64 Pol. Sc. Q. 481 (1949).
Riesman, Book Review, 41 Col. L. Rev. 358, 362 (1941).
Bendix, Social Science and The Distrust of Reason, Univ. of Calif. Publications
in Sociology and Social Institutions, No. 1 (1951).
I Glazer, "The American Soldier" As Science, 8 Commentary 487 (1949).
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should beware lest we have partisan "social science" experts engaging in such
performances. If judges were foolish enough to accord high esteem to social
studies relating to the obvious, such conflicts of partisan "social scientists"-
with some reporting against and others for the obvious-might persuade the
judges to become doubtful about their own good sense, resulting from common
human experience, concerning the fundamentals of a decent civilization. For
a brilliant discussion of this thesis, see Edmond Cahn's paper recently published
in the New York University Law Review.6'
I am not saying that all ideas or theories must be justified as useful or practical.
Men may legitimately play with ideas, contrive them just for fun. And, para-
doxically, the natural sciences owe many of their most practical achievements
to "playful" thinking that had no empirical, utilitarian aim, for example, non-
Euclidean geometry and Pascal's theory of probability. However, most con-
temporary "social scientists" purport to be at work on useful projects, not to
be merely playing with ideas.02
8. I happen to believe-and have often so written-that the courts have
much to learn from the psychologists and psychiatrists with reference not only
to the treatment of convicted criminals but also to witnesses and litigants; that
lawyers who are to become judges should, while law students, engage in voyages
of self-exploration, aided by psychiatrists, so that they will be conscious of their
otherwise unconscious prejudices; and that there should be government psy-
chiatrists to whom government officers, including judges, could turn (with no
more concern than visits to dentists) in periods of emotional disturbance.0 3 Yet
it will not do for courts-or for anyone else-to regard psychiatrists as infallible
demigods, since psychiatry is still in its infancy or early adolescence.
I inight add that, for everybody's sake, there is need for psychiatric and
anthropological studies of lawyers, judges, social psychologists, sociologists,
economists, political scientists, historians, and other students of society. (Com-
pare Kubie's paper on the Psychoneurotic Problems of The American Scientist,4
and Riesman's on the psychology of lawyers. 65)
9. It may be that, as Dr. Lawrence Freedman suggests, an effective fusion
of legal and psychiatric knowledge must await the time when both kinds of
knowledge are in one skull. That day is approaching.06
Perhaps in some way, rather than through Ernst's proposal, we will arrive
at what he envisions. For instance, in respect of a fusion of accounting and
legal knowledge, we have already arrived there: Several law schools now ade-
quately teach accounting for lawyers.
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 150 (1955).
'The unintended by-products of their projects may stimulate valuable specu-
lative ideas; and, too, such a project may, desirably, prove a negative.
Probably James Forrestal could have been saved if such a psychiatrist had
been easily available to him in the early days of his emotional fatigue.
3 Chicago Rev. 65 (1954).
Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 30(1951).
In Yale Law School, at the moment, we have a student who has had considerable
experience as a practicing clinical psychologist and is well versed in psychiatry;
and I know one lawyer who has become a practicing psychoanalyst.
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10. I think we should forego the dream of anything remotely like "social
science." But to surrender that dream is not to despair of vastly improving our
knowledge of mankind and of individual human beings. Such knowledge demands
modesty and constructive skepticism, or what may be called the "scientific
spirit" which entails the discipline of suspended judgment; the rigorous examina-
tion of all the evidence; a consideration of all possible theories; the questioning
of the plausible and the seemingly self-evident; a passion for verification and
a recognition of the unverifiable; what Fries describes as a willingness to "doing
one's damndest to poke holes in one's theoretical assumption,"67 plus a desire
not to be deceived. Illustrative is a paper published in 1947 by Hansen and
Eldridge, expert social statisticians, on future urban growth in this country.
Their "estimates," they say "are projections, not predictions," and are "pre-
sented . . . in accordance with varying assumptions" which represent "great
oversimplification." They notify the reader that "the only thing of which we
can be certain is that (our) assumptions will not hold. '68
Our problem vis-a-vis specialists is like that of the young lady to to whom
Bernard Shaw's Bishop said that she would be making a mistake if she married
but a worse mistake if she didn't. We must have specialists. But we must
democratize them, see to it that they admit their all-too-human characteristics.69
Too many judges in the past have been authoritarian, arrogantly undemocratic.
The present tendency of American judges is candidly and modestly to confess
to the public that they are human and therefore fallible.
Only if the students of society disclose such modesty and skepticism, con-
cerning their own work, should they, and will they, gain the confidence of the
courts. The courts will then use the insights of those students, thus tentatively
ventured, for what they are worth (which then may be considerable). The
danger, at the moment, is that the more brash among these specialists, by their
very brashness, may make the courts suspicious of all the social studies. As
Edmond Cahn points out in his New York University Law Review article, some
of the "social scientists" who, on behalf of the successful plaintiffs, testified or
contributed to briefs presented to the Supreme Court in the Segregation Cases
are now immodestly boasting that their contributions brought about the Supreme
Court's decision. They base this boast on the citations of books and articles
by "social scientists," in footnote 11 to the Court's opinion.70 But Caln remarks
that in the latest of the cited works-Witmer and Kotinsky's Personality in the
Making-the authors modestly say: "Unfortunately for scientific accuracy and
adequacy, thoroughly satisfactory methods of determining the effects of prejudice
and discrimination on health of personality have not yet been devised, nor has
Fries, On The Unification of Science, 3 Am. J. of Econ. & Soc. 193 (1944).
See also Notestein, The Economics of Population and Food Supplies, in Pro-
ceedings of The Fourteenth International Conference on Agricultural Economics 13(1954). Notestein's views concerning the effects of contraceptives on population
growh should be compared with Ernst's.
.Courts often undertake historical studies. Max Radin said that, as most judges
are poorly equipped for that task, they should seek the counsel of professional his-
torians. Most professional historians, however, are undemocratic, i.e., usually do not
reveal, to others than members of their own craft, how dubious are many of their
"facts." See, e.g., Frank, Fate and Freedom, c. 1-7 and passini (1945).
' Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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a sufficient number of studies dealing with the various minority groups been
made."
Happy to relate, this chastened mood of modesty is taking hold of a sub-
stantial minority of the professional students of society. They no longer allow
themselves to be beguiled by the dehumanized "social engineering" metaphor.
The anthropologist Redfield, for example, has recently described the painful
struggle of some students of society to break away from the thraldom of the
natural science analogy, to become more humanistic and less "scientific." In
the struggle, says Redfield, "Sometimes the social scientist seems a man divided
against himself, half mathematician and half poet"; when he attains "maturity,"
he "may see that in accepting too often and too uncritically the identity of his
ways of work and those of the natural scientists, he asserted or implied that he
had a power of describing reality more accurate and significant than it was. He
may see that some of the claims to scientific precision ... and to the im-
portance of his generalizations were overblown."'71 Talcott Parsons, speaking
of developments in the study of "personality and social structure," remarks,
"I think ... the most important thing to be said at this stage is that what is
not known is immensely more than what is known. There are starting points so
that really serious and competent research has promise of producing extremely
important results. Therefore, I would put my hope in what can be produced in
the future rather than in being in too great a rush to apply what we have now;
while what we can do now is something, the dangers are also considerable and
we need to know a lot more than we do."72
Ernst's proposal might be beneficial if all concerned were to approach the
undertaking in that spirit. I incline, however, to believe that frequent informal
talk-fests of open-minded lawyers and modest, imaginative students of society
offer more promise than any formal "commission of inquiry."
J. L. Montrose*
THE IMMEDIATE REACTION of a Northern Ireland law teacher-myself-to Mr.
Ernst's paper is that they order these things better in America. The perennial
philosophy of my law teaching has been the very old, but never stale, theme that
for the study of law it is not enough to be acquainted with the words of legal
rules, one must be aware of the characteristics of society and of the ideals of
man. It is folly to believe that such knowledge can be acquired without an aware-
ness of the disciplines treating of those matters-a good lawyer cannot ignore
the social sciences or philosophy. I have pointed out that this has been not alone
the teaching of academic lawyers but also of the great judges. Holmes has been
quoted with reverence, and it has been suggested that perhaps his prediction has
'Redfield, Social Scientist: Man Between, 8 Chicago Review 35, 41-42 (1954).
Parsons, Personality and Social Structure, in Personality and Political Crisis
61, 75 (Stanton and Perry ed., 1951).
*Dean of Faculty of Law, Queen's University of Belfast; Vice-President, Asso-
ciation of University Teachers of the United Kingdom.
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